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Comment
When Your Doctor Says, "You Have Nothing to Worry
About," Don't Be So Sure: The Effect of Fabio v.
Bellomo on Medical Malpractice Actions
in Minnesota
David W. Feeder II
In 19841 Dr. James Bellomo examined Deloras Fabio, his
long-time patient, and discovered a lump in her left breast.2 In-
stead of ordering a mammogram or biopsy of the lump, Dr. Bel-
lomo dismissed it as a "fibrous mass," and told Fabio "not to
worry about it." 3 Subsequently, Dr. Bellomo found the same
lump during a 1986 examination; again he failed to take any
action, assuring Fabio that she had nothing to worry about.4
Several months later, a different doctor diagnosed Fabio with
breast cancer. By that time, the cancer had already metasta-
sized to four lymph nodes.5 Fabio subsequently filed a medical
malpractice suit against Dr. Bellomo for his failure to properly
diagnose and treat her breast cancer in 1986. Fabio later at-
tempted to amend her complaint to include charges of malprac-
tice based on the 1984 examination.6 Dr. Bellomo moved for
summary judgment and contested Fabio's attempted amend-
ment based on Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations on
1. The plaintiff failed to establish the exact date of this examination, stat-
ing only that it occurred sometime between 1982 and 1984. Because the lower
court disposed of the case on summary judgment, however, the court of appeals
viewed all questions of fact in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. For that
reason, the parties and the reviewing courts consistently state that this exami-
nation occurred in 1984. This Comment does likewise.
2. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1993). Dr. Bellomo be-
came Fabio's primary care physician in 1977, and he continued in that capacity
until his retirement in June of 1986. Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 242
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993).
3. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760.
4. Id.
5. Id. Fabio undervent a modified radical mastectomy to remove her left
breast and then undervent nine months of chemotherapy which neutralized
the cancer. Fabio, 489 N.W.2d at 243.
6. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1993).
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medical malpractice actions. 7 The trial court denied Fabio's mo-
tion to amend her complaint 8 and granted summary judgment
in favor of Dr. Bellomo because Fabio failed to establish a suffi-
cient causal relationship between the delay in treatment and
any harm to herself.9 The Minnesota Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 10 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that,
as a matter of law, Dr. Bellomo's examinations of Fabio's breast
in 1984 and 1986 did not constitute a continuing course of treat-
ment. Thus, the two year statute of limitations began to run in
1984. The court affirmed the summary judgment, finding that
Fabio failed to establish causation and damages with regard to
the 1986 examination. 1
Fabio v. Bellomo raises two important medical malpractice
issues: whether multiple misdiagnoses of a latent disease con-
stitute a continuing course of treatment for purposes of tolling
the Minnesota medical malpractice statute of limitations, and
whether a misdiagnosed cancer patient who maintains "at least
a 50-50 chance" of long-term survival can show causation and
damages necessary to sustain a medical malpractice suit in
Minnesota.
This Comment examines the effect of Fabio v. Bellomo on
medical malpractice actions in Minnesota. Part I discusses med-
ical malpractice causes of action, with emphasis on the legisla-
tive restrictions on these claims and Minnesota's medical
malpractice statute of limitations. Part II analyzes the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in Fabio. Part III
discusses the effect of Fabio on medical malpractice actions in
Minnesota, particularly with regard to the continuing course of
treatment exception to the two-year statute of limitations, and
to medical malpractice causation and damages law. This Com-
ment asserts that Fabio unnecessarily upsets the balance of in-
terests maintained by medical malpractice actions in favor of
physicians, and that the Minnesota legislature should act to re-
verse this result and clarify this area of the law. This Comment
concludes by proposing a framework for legislative action, in-
cluding a model medical malpractice statute of limitations which
7. Id. at 760-61; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (1992).
8. Fabio, 489 N.W.2d at 243. The trial court determined that Dr. Bel-
lomo's treatment of Fabio's breast with regard to the 1984 examination ended
after that examination; the two year statute of limitations thus barred any ac-
tion based on the 1984 examination. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 246-47.
11. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762-63.
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more equitably balances the significant competing interests-
those of individual patients and the medical profession.
I. RESTRAINTS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS:
CHECKING THE VITAL SIGNS
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Physicians 12 can be liable in tort'3 for professional malprac-
tice14 when patients sustain injuries while under their care.
Generally, patients sue physicians in negligence. 15 A negligence
action can arise from a physician's action 16 or inaction. 17 Mal-
practice law protects patients' rights,' 8 balancing their concerns
12. This Comment uses "physicians" broadly to refer to all health care pro-
fessionals. Many state statutes that govern malpractice actions specify in
broad and sometimes lengthy terms the wide range of health care professionals
covered by the regulations. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (Supp. 1992)
("chiropractor, clinical laboratory technologist or technician, dentist, naturo-
path, nurse, nursing home administrator, dispensing optician, optometrist, os-
teopath, physician or surgeon, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, or
veterinarian").
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 185-93 (5th ed. 1984). The doctor-patient relationship, however, rarely
supports a patient's action in contract. Id. at 186 (stating that doctors only
incur contract liability when they expressly contract to cure a patient or accom-
plish a particular result).
14. Malpractice is defined as "[pirofessional misconduct or unreasonable
lack of skill." BiAcis LAv DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). For a thorough dis-
cussion of professional malpractice in the medical field see generally, DAVID M.
HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1987); 2 J. D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL,
MODERN TORT LAW § 25 (Rev. ed. 1988); 1 DAVID W. LOUIsELL & HAROLD WIL-
LIANIS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1992).
15. To establish a prima facie case of negligent care and treatment against
a physician, a plaintiff must normally prove several elements: the standard of
care recognized by the medical community as applicable to the particular de-
fendant; that the defendant departed from that standard; and that the defend-
ant's departure was a direct cause of the plaintiffs injuries. See Plutshack v.
University of Minn. Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1982).
16. See, e.g., City of Sommerset v. Hart, 549 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1977) (holding
surgeon negligent for a scalpel blade found in patient's bladder after surgery to
remove a kidney stone); Conrad v. Lakewood Gen. Hosp., 410 P.2d 785 (Wash.
1966) (holding surgeon who left hemostat inside patient's body negligent as a
matter of law).
17. See, e.g., Baloney v. Carter, 387 So. 2d 54 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
physicians negligent for failing to diagnose and treat patient's fractured pelvis
and fractured right leg when patient suffered four additional days of pain and
inconvenience as a result of the delay in treatment); Mehlman v. Powell, 378
A.2d 1121 (Md. 1977) (holding physicians negligent for failing to correctly inter-
pret electrocardiogram when patient consequently died from pulmonary embo-
lism). These cases, involving negligent omissions or diagnostic failures, provide
the common law support for many of the arguments in this Comment.
18. "[Tlhe tort lawsuit is the system which our society has evolved for help-
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against those of physicians19 and providing a vital check on phy-
sicians' broad power and discretion.20
ing people who have been caused to suffer physical and/or mental injury
through no fault of their own." LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, % 1.04, at
1-11. In addition, malpractice also allocates the risk of loss in society:
The law of torts, then, is concerned with the allocation of losses arising
out of human activities; and since these cover a wide scope, so does this
branch of the law .... ["]The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust
these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one
person as the result of the conduct of another."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 6 (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction
to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944)).
19. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, 9I 1.02, at 1-6.
Society has a significant interest in the just disposition of malpractice
claims. Success of ill-founded, albeit honestly made, claims can have
harmful effects in thwarting reasonable innovations in medical prac-
tice and genuine progress of the healing arts. Failure of sound
claims-particularly when it results from denial of the substance of the
right to a fair hearing-fosters continuation of malpractice.
Id. Achieving a proper balance of these interests is vital to society: "Too many
unfounded and unsupportable lawsuits could, conceivably, lead to the discour-
agement of the medical experimenters on the one hand, and the young legal
lions on the other, both of whom must flourish in order to assure the proper and
balanced development of our society." Id. 9 1.01, at 1-5. Evidence suggests,
however, that the present "balance" has shifted significantly in favor of physi-
cians. See Kenneth Jost, Fault-Free Malpractice, 80 A.B.A. J. 46, 47-48 (1994)
(citing recent Medical Practice Study directed by Harvard Law School professor
Paul Weiler). Injury and death caused by negligent medical treatment is more
prevalent than previously recognized. Id. Few patients-about one in eight-
file malpractice claims, and only one in sixteen patients who do file claims re-
ceive any compensation. Id. at 48.
20. Physicians wield considerable power and authority in American
society:
[Tihe magnitude of the influence exerted by many physicians upon
their patients is at times awesome. What "the doctor said" is still re-
garded by some as an inviolable order, to be followed or trusted until
specifically changed by the physician himself. It is surprising how na-
ive, how unquestioning a non-medical person, even one of superior in-
telligence and education, often appears to be in relation to orders or
advice from a physician. Whether regarded as a god-like creature or
simply an educated person whose presumed superior knowledge and
judgment are not to be doubted by a mere "layman," the physician usu-
ally is in a position directly or indirectly to control factors which are
vital to his patient's physical and mental well-being.
LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, 9 2.02, at 2-9. Deloras Fabio, the plaintiff
in Fabio v. Bellomo, also echoed these notions during her deposition:
[Q. Was your husband concerned about the lump in your breast?]
A. No, because Dr. Bellomo had told me it was nothing. He's our doc-
tor and we relied on him.
Q. Did you ever talk to anyone else about the lump; a friend or another
doctor?
A. You don't when your doctor tells you it's nothing. You don't tell
somebody else you have got this lump.
Q. Would it be would [sic] fair to say that you kind of put it out of your
mind at that time?
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Most physicians have significant concerns over potential
malpractice liability, particularly in light of the rapidly advanc-
ing bio-medical technologies and the large number of patients
treated.21 Today, medical practice requires malpractice insur-
ance as much as it does a stethoscope. 22 During the 1970s, a
significant rise in the number of malpractice claims and recov-
eries against physicians23 caused malpractice insurance rates to
increase dramatically.24 The increase in claims and recoveries,
in turn, forced physicians to purchase greater levels of insurance
protection.25 Many physicians struggled and some failed to ob-
tain malpractice insurance. 26 This development, widely de-
scribed as a medical malpractice insurance "crisis," carries with
it real, perceived, and predicted corresponding impacts on the
health care profession and its ability to provide affordable serv-
ices to the public. 27 Consequently, state courts and legislatures
A. Right.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Assoc. at 1, Fabio v. Bellomo,
504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993) (No. C6-91-2542) [hereinafter MTLA Amicus
Brief] (quoting deposition of Deloras Fabio at 32). Similar themes run through-
out popular culture as well. Cf. MALICE (Columbia Pictures 1993) (Physician
charged with malpractice, played by Alec Baldwin, when asked during a deposi-
tion whether he had a "god complex," the notion that physicians become intoxi-
cated by the power to heal and save lives, responded, "I am god.").
21. "A major reason that today's care is so hazardous is that advances in
medical science have made possible bolder interventions (and more favorable
outcomes), often in more fragile patients. Therefore, the consequences of errors
are likely to be far more serious." Paul C. Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical
Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355, 2355 (1992).
22. In 1990, the average jury verdict in medical malpractice cases was $1.2
million. Sarah Glazer, Whatever Happened to the Malpractice Insurance Crisis?
WASH. POST J. MED. HEALTH Sci. & Soc'y, July 9, 1991, at 11 (citing survey by
Jury Research Inc.). That same year, however, the average malpractice claim
paid by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. of Minnesota, the largest mal-
practice underwriter in the country, was $36,400, reflecting the large number of
out-of-court settlements and the tendency of judges to reduce jury awards. Id.
Even with this reduced pay-out figure, physicians who do not purchase mal-
practice insurance risk bankruptcy in the event of even one successful claim.
23. See Patricia M. Danzon, The "Crisis" in Medical Malpractice: A Com-
parison of Trends in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Aus-
tralia, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTx CARE 48, 48-49, 49 fig.1, 51 fig.2 (1990)
(discussing and diagramming the increase in medical malpractice claim fre-
quency and severity between 1974 and 1986).
24. See id. at 49, 52 fig.3 (detailing and diagramming the increase in medi-
cal malpractice insurance costs between 1978 and 1984).
25. See id. at 49 & n.11 ("The percentage of physicians carrying at least $1
million in coverage increased from 21 percent in 1976 to 41 percent in 1983.").
26. Mitchell S. Berger, Note, Following the Doctor's Orders-Caps on Non-
Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 RuTrGEs L.J. 173, 175 &
n.15 (1990).
27. Numerous commentators have analyzed the "medical malpractice cri-
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took action to help alleviate the "crisis" by restricting its per-
ceived cause-medical malpractice claims.
B. RESPONSES TO THE "CRIsIs"-"TORT REFORM" AND
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
In response to the medical malpractice insurance "crisis,"
nearly every state enacted some measure of "tort reform."28
Tort reform represents an ongoing policy, one that politicians
continue to debate and discuss. 29 Indeed, tort reform currently
merits serious consideration as politicians, the media, and inter-
est groups address the issues of health care reform and medical
costs.3 0 Tort reformers generally seek to reduce physicians' lia-
bility exposure and risk. To this end, they have pursued a vari-
sis" from many perspectives. See, e.g., id. at 174-80 (reviewing the "crisis" and
the legislative responses to it and specifically examining caps on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice claims); James R. Posner, Trends in Medical
Malpractice Insurance 1970-1985, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 37-47 (1986)
(reviewing the "crisis" and the legislative responses to it from the perspective of
the insurance industry); cf Danzon, supra note 23 (reviewing trends in medical
malpractice claims, awards, and insurance costs in a cross-cultural compari-
son); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-No AGREEMENT
ON THE PROBLEMS OR SOLUTIONS (1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT I] (reviewing
the U.S. medical malpractice situation and examining views of health care
providers, consumers, and attorneys). But see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About The Behavior Of The Tort Litigation System-And Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992) (challenging the validity of any conclusions
which are based on previous or current data on the tort system). For a thor-
ough historical review of the "crisis" and the legislative responses to it, see gen-
erally Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A
Retrospective, 49 LAw & CONTEm'. PROBS. 5 (1986).
28. GAO REPORT I, supra note 27, at 2. Tort reform seeks reduction of lia-
bility exposure and risk for physicians as its primary objective. Ultimately,
however, legislatures must balance this goal against the greater interests of
society, particularly the rights and interests of medical malpractice victims.
29. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTicE-A
FRAM~wORK FOR ACTION (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT II]; GAO REPORT I,
supra note 27 (discussing and analyzing the issue without any recommenda-
tions for reform). Indeed, President Bush and Vice-President Quayle made tort
reform a focus of their unsuccessful 1992 re-election campaign, blaming villain-
ous trial lawyers who wear "tasseled loafers" for the medical malpractice crisis.
See Transcript of the '92 Vice Presidential Debate (Part 1), reprinted in WASH.
POST, Oct. 14, 1992, at A15, A16 (remarks of Vice President Dan Quayle) ("Med-
ical malpractice legislation has been before the Congress of the United States
and you [Al Gore] tried to convince the American people that Bill Clinton is for
tort reform? The biggest campaign contributors to your campaign are the trial
lawyers of America.... Bill Clinton is not for tort reform.").
30. See, e.g., Weiler et al., supra note 21 (discussing medical malpractice
liability reform); Jeffrey O'Connell & Michael Horowitz, The Lawyer Will See
You Now: Health Reform's Tort Crisis, WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at C3 (dis-
cussing the issue of tort reform as it relates to health care reform). For a broad
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ety of strategies: establishing limitations on damage
recoveries, 31 restricting the "collateral source rule,"3 2 requiring
review by medical boards,33 and increasing restrictions, such as
statutes of limitations, on plaintiffs seeking to bring medical
malpractice actions.
Of these reforms, statutes of limitations3 4 constitute the
most prevalent restrictions on plaintiffs seeking to bring medi-
cal malpractice suits. These statutes require plaintiffs to bring
claims within a specified time period, barring any action that
fails to comply.35 Statutes of limitations protect both defend-
ants and the judicial system from the hardship of litigating stale
claims.36 In practice, this focus on defendants and judicial re-
sources overshadows the concerns of plaintiffs, often to their det-
riment.37 The limitation period normally begins to "run" as the
discussion of tort reform issues, see Symposium, Tort Reform: Will It Advance
Justice in the Civil System, 32 VLL. L. REV. 1211 (1987).
31. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 26; Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind
Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of Medical Malpractice Dam-
age Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 11 (1991).
32. The collateral source rule provides that if the patient recovers certain
elements of damage from a source other than the tortfeasor (i.e. insurance),
that amount does not reduce the tortfeasor's liability. See LOUISELL & WIi-
LiS, supra note 14, ' 12.14, at 12-56.
33. See, e.g., Richard Boyle, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: A Ju-
dicial Evaluation of Their Practical Effect, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 939 (1981) (argu-
ing that medical malpractice panels provide a sound solution to medical
malpractice crisis); Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181
(1990) (advocating legislation providing for screening panels as a means to ad-
dress the medical malpractice problem).
34. Legislatures alone create statutes of limitations; the common law im-
poses no such restrictions. See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn.
1993) (Gardebring, J., joined by Wahl & Page, JJ., dissenting) (citing Robert
Muscara, Note, Tort Law-Federal Tort Claims Act-Accrual of Medical Mal-
practice Actions, United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), 4 W. NEW. ENG.
L. REV. 155, 158 (1981)).
35. See generally, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950) [hereinafter Developments] (seminal discussion on
statutes of limitations).
36. See id. at 1185-86 (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations).
The primary consideration underlying [statutes of limitations] is un-
doubtedly one of fairness to the defendant. There comes a time when
he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called
on to resist a claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
Id. at 1185 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)) (footnotes omitted).
37. See id. at 1205 ("As between the duly diligent plaintiff and the wrong-
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result of an objective or discernable act or event, such as the
date of an incident or injury.38 Injuries sustained from acts of
medical malpractice, however, often fail to fully manifest them-
selves and evade discovery for many years.39 Thus, the point at
which the limitations period commences is extremely significant
for medical malpractice claims.
All states have enacted statutes of limitations governing
tort actions, and a majority of states have enacted statutes that
specifically restrict medical malpractice claims.40 Medical mal-
doer, the courts have been unnecessarily sympathetic towards the latter, in
shortening the period in which it is likely that the plaintiff will bring an action
or in entirely depriving the plaintiff of a practical remedy.").
38. See id. at 1200-19 (discussing commencement of the statutory period).
39. See Susan S. Septimus, The Concept of Continuous Tort as Applied to
Medical Malpractice: Sleeping Beauty for Plaintiff, Slumbering Beast for De-
fendant, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 71, 78 & n.41 (detailing latent diseases and inju-
ries). Undetected cancer is a paradigm of these cases, and "[bireast cancer in
women is probably the malignancy most often involved in these [failure to de-
tect cancer medical malpractice] cases." HARNEY, supra note 14, at 109. Breast
cancer is a very serious, complex, and unique disease. See W. Russell Corker,
Legal Aspects of Breast Cancer, TRAUMA Aug. 1991, at 59; Harold L. Hirsh, The
Emotional Assault of Breast Cancer, TRAuMA Aug. 1992, at 55.
40. Thirty-one states have enacted a separate statute of limitations specific
to medical malpractice actions: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1993); Arkan-
sas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (Michie Supp. 1993); California, CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102.5
(Supp. 1993); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (1989); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-71 (Michie Supp. 1993); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3
(Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-212 (Smith-Hurd
1992); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-19-1 (Burns 1986); Louisiana, LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (West 1991); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902
(West 1990); Maryland, MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-109(a) (1989);
Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5838a (West 1989); Mississippi, MIss.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1993); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon
Supp. 1993); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (1993); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1988); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.097 (Michie
Supp. 1993); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Michie 1989); New York,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214-a (McKinney 1990); Oklahoma, OxLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 76, § 18 (West 1989); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1992); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-2-14.1 (1984);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (1980); Texas, TEx. REV. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590i (West 1994); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (1992); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Supp. 1993); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.350 (West Supp. 1993); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (Supp.
1993); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 1983); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-3-107 (Supp. 1993).
In addition, the following states have enacted a scheme in which a general
statute of limitations provision makes specific reference to medical malpractice
actions: Arizona, ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(1) (1992); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1991); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b)
(West 1982); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (1990); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
950
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practice statutes of limitations have two essential components:
the actual limitations period and the point at which the cause of
action accrues. These statutes vary little with respect to time
periods, as nearly all states require plaintiffs to bring suit
within one to three years of the accrual of the cause of action,
with the vast majority adopting a two year limitation.41 Courts
and legislatures, however, recognize tolling doctrines, which
postpone the harsh effects of these statutes.42 Nevertheless,
many states have enacted statutes of repose,43 which establish
§ 614.1(9) (West Supp. 1993); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(7), (c)
(1983); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(e),(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1992); Minne-
sota, Mn-N. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West Supp. 1993); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01 to 18(3)
(1991); Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Anderson Supp. 1992); Ore-
gon, OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1988); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1 to
14.1 (Supp. 1993); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A),(C) (Michie 1992).
Only five states apply a general civil tort statute of limitations to medical
malpractice actions: Alaska, A.AsKA STAT. § 9.10.070 (1983); District of Colum-
bia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1989); New Hampshire, N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 508:4 (Supp. 1993); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987); Penn-
sylvania, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Supp. 1993). For a detailed com-
parison of these statutes, see infra Appendix I (graphically summarizing
statutes of limitations of all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
41. Notably, the following states provide a one year limitation period for
medical malpractice claims: Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, and Tennessee. See
statutes cited supra note 40. At the opposite extreme, California, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington provide a three
year limitation. See statutes cited supra note 40. New York's limitation period
is two years, six months. See statutes cited supra note 40. In Maryland, Ne-
vada, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the time limitation varies depending on the ac-
crual of the action: In Maryland, plaintiffs must bring actions five years from
the date of the act, or three years from discovery, whichever occurs earlier; Ver-
mont requires action within three years from the date of the act, or two years
from discovery, whichever occurs later; and Wisconsin's limitation period is
three years from the date of the act, or one year from discovery, whichever oc-
curs later. See statutes cited supra note 40. All other states provide two-year
limitation periods. See statutes cited supra note 40.
42. Tolling doctrines delay the running of statutes of limitations. See De-
velopments, supra note 35, at 1220-37 (discussing various doctrines).
43. The operative feature of a statute of repose is that it cuts off a cause of
action, regardless of whether the individual is aware that the cause of action
exists. See Christopher J. Trombetta, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical
Malpractice Statutes of Repose: Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34
VILL. L. REv. 397, 401 (1989) ("If the statutory period commences upon the oc-
currence of an event, regardless of when the injury occurs, at a time when the
plaintiff may or may not be aware of an injury, the statute is properly termed a
statute of repose."). In a state (i.e. Minnesota) that does not recognize the dis-
covery rule, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text, a statute of limita-
tions that runs from the date of the act functions identically to a statute of
repose. Trombetta, supra at 401-02. Alabama's statutory repose language is
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an absolute time limitation for medical malpractice claims and
effectively negate tolling doctrines or delayed accrual
mechanisms.44
Determinations of when a cause of action accrues, however,
vary widely by state. Generally, in tort cases, causes of action
accrue at the time of injury, which usually coincides with the act
causing the injury. In medical malpractice cases, however, the
manifestation of the injury can occur many years after the act.
Cases involving failure to diagnose a latent disease are particu-
larly troublesome. A statute of limitations that begins to run at
the date of the incident can lead to highly unfair results because
patients almost always discover the injury well after the limita-
tion period has run. In response to this manifest unfairness,
courts developed the "discovery rule" doctrine, which tolls the
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably
should have discovered, the injury.45 The discovery rule is
based on the fundamental notion of fairness to plaintiffs,46 and
typical. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a) (1993) (providing "that in no event may the
action be commenced more than four years after such act"). Faced with consti-
tutional challenges to statutes of repose-both on due process and equal protec-
tion grounds-state courts are divided. Compare Trombetta, supra with
Josephine Herring Hicks, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose:
Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REv. 627 (1985).
44. The following states incorporate statutes of repose that run from the
date of the incident into their statute of limitations: Alabama (four years); Cali-
fornia (three years); Colorado (three years); Connecticut (three years); Dela-
ware (three years); Florida (four years); Georgia (five years); Hawaii (six years);
Illinois (four years); Iowa (six years); Kansas (four years); Kentucky (five years);
Louisiana (three years); Massachusetts (seven years); Michigan (six years);
Montana (five years); Nebraska (ten years); Nevada (four years); North Caro-
lina (four years); North Dakota (six years); Ohio (four years); Oregon (five
years); South Carolina (six years); Tennessee (three years); Utah (four years);
Vermont (seven years); Washington (eight years); West Virginia (ten years);
Wisconsin (five years). See statues cited supra note 40.
45. The discovery rule doctrine, a significant change in malpractice law,
generally provides that the limitations period does not begin to run "until the
patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should
have discovered," the injury. See LEE & LnqDAHL, supra note 14, § 25.83. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has recognized the discovery rule as applicable to mal-
practice cases brought against the government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
46. The unfairness caused by strict application of statutes of limitations,
without regard to whether the patient has discovered the injury, is obvious, and
has received wide discussion:
[In 'situations... where no injury or damage becomes apparent con-
temporaneously with the negligent act, the application of the general
rule that a cause of action exists from the time the negligent act was
committed would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured
party's right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations
before he is even aware of its existence.'
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the few states that do not recognize it provide poignant exam-
ples of the injustice that results in its absence.47 Consequently,
nearly every state embraces at least the basic notion behind the
discovery rule.48
In addition to the discovery rule, several states make spe-
cial allowances for situations in which a continuing course of
treatment with a physician effectively prevents a patient from
acting on or discovering an injury until the treatment or rela-
tionship ceases.49 States that recognize the "continuing course
LEE & LmDAHiL, supra note 14, at 370 (quoting Wyler v. Tripi, 267 N.E.2d 419
(Ohio 1971) (footnote omitted)). "The obvious injustice that so often flowed from
the application of the old rule disturbed the conscience and the sense of fairness
in both legislators and the judiciary." LOuiSELL & WILLiAMS, supra note 14,
13.07, at 13-20.
47. See, e.g., Francis v. Hansing, 449 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
The defendant physician inserted a "Safety Coil IUD" into the plaintiff in April
1967, and subsequently in May of the same year inserted a "Lippies Loop IUD"
into the plaintiff, assuming the first IUD had been "expelled." Id. at 480. In the
spring of 1987, an ultrasound revealed the presence of the coil IUD in the plain-
tiffs uterus, and it was subsequently surgically removed. Id. Despite the fact
that the plaintiff was unaware of the injury for nearly 20 years, the court dis-
missed the suit based on the statute of limitations, refusing to apply the discov-
ery rule. Id. at 480-82.
48. The following states, a strong majority, make some provision for discov-
ery of the injury in determining when the cause of action accrues in their medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. See statutes cited supra note 40. In the following 13 of
the 19 jurisdictions in which the legislature has not incorporated the discovery
rule in the statute of limitations, the judiciary nonetheless reads the doctrine
into the statutes: Alaska, Pedersen v. Sielski, 822 P.2d 903 (Alaska 1991); Ari-
zona, Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967); District of Columbia,
Stager v. Schneider, 494 A.2d 1307 (D.C. 1985); Georgia, Whitaker v. Zirkle,
374 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 913 (Ga. Nov. 23,
1988); Idaho, Johnson v. Stoddard, 526 P.2d 835 (Idaho 1974); Indiana, Utley v.
United States, 624 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Maine, Black v. Ward, 549
A.2d 371 (Me. 1988); Massachusetts, Riley v. Presnell, 565 N.E.2d 780 (Mass.
1991); New York, Harkin v. Culleton, 544 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989);
Ohio, Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1983);
Pennsylvania, Morgan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 511 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986); Texas, Gatling v. Perna, 788 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1900); and Vir-
ginia, Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.Va. 1980). Thus, the vast
majority of states recognize the discovery rule to some extent.
49. See LEE & LnmDHL, supra note 14, § 25.84. In addition, many courts
and legislatures recognize other significant, but less popular tolling doctrines:
fraudulent concealment; cases in which a foreign object has been left in a pa-
tient's body; and infancy, minority, or incompetency of the patient at the time of
the injury. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102.5(3)(a) (concealment), (3)(b)
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of treatment" doctrine do so to encourage trust in the physician-
patient relationship. 50 The continuing course of treatment doc-
trine alleviates the same concerns as the discovery rule, provid-
ing an alternate protection for plaintiffs against the unfairness
caused by undiscovered injuries.51 Although only three states
formally recognize the doctrine in their medical malpractice
statutes of limitations,52 courts in seventeen other states have
adopted the rule.53
(foreign object), (3)(d)(I) (infancy/minority), (3)(d)(II) (disability) (Supp. 1993).
Disability, as defined in the relevant statute, includes both minority and
mental incompetency. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-101 (1987).
50. See, e.g., Swang v. Hauser, 180 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (Minn. 1970) ("A
policy reason [for the continuing treatment doctrine] is that the patient must
repose reliance upon his physician in the completion of the course of curative
treatment.... ."); McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (N.Y. 1982) ("The
policy underlying the continuing treatment doctrine seeks to maintain the phy-
sician-patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care
will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to
cure.").
51. See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring,
J., joined by Wahl & Page, JJ., dissenting) ("The 'continuing course of treat-
ment' doctrine has evolved as a compromise to ameliorate potential unfairness
resulting from delayed discovery of an injury." (footnote omitted)).
52. The three states are New York, North Carolina, and Texas. See stat-
utes cited supra note 40.
53. Alabama, Moore v. Averi, 534 So.2d 250 (Ala. 1988); Arkansas, Taylor
v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 303 (Ark. 1990); Colorado, Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d
845 (Colo. 1987); Connecticut, Connell v. Colwell, 571 A.2d 116 (Conn. 1990);
Indiana, Ferrell v. Geisler, 505 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Michigan,
Amrhein v. Philip Petachenko, D.C., P.C., 435 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988);
Minnesota, Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W. 622 (Minn. 1931); Missouri, Green v.
Washington Univ. Medical Ctr., 761 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Nebraska,
Ourada v. Cochran, 449 N.W.2d 211 (Neb. 1989); New Jersey, Fleishman v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 226 A-2d 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); North
Carolina, Callahan v. Rogers, 365 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Ohio, Wells
v. Johening, 578 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); South Dakota, Wells v. Bil-
lars, 391 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1986); Virginia, Justice v. Natvig, 381 S.E.2d 8 (Va.
1989); Washington, Adams v. Allen, 783 P.2d 635 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Wis-
consin, Robinson by Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical Ctr., 402 N.W.2d 711
(Wis. 1987); Wyoming, Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985). In addi-
tion, some states that specifically reject continuing course of treatment as a
tolling doctrine nonetheless allow application of the doctrine within their medi-
cal malpractice schemes. See, e.g., Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 659-62 (Del.
1987) (rejecting continuing course of treatment as a tolling doctrine, but al-
lowing a cause of action for "continuous negligent medical treatment" where the
cause of action accrues at termination of treatment); Cunningham v. Huffman,
609 N.E.2d 321, 324-25 (Ill. 1993) (specifically rejecting continuing course of
treatment as a tolling doctrine, but interpreting the statutory language regard-
ing accrual of the cause of action-at "occurrence" causing injury-to allow ex-
amination of continuing course of treatment).
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C. MINNESOTA!S RESPONSES-JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE
RESTRICTIONS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
The judiciary restricts medical malpractice actions primar-
ily through its construction and interpretation of the common
law. Although medical malpractice is based on the tort of negli-
gence,54 courts often treat these actions distinctly. In Minne-
sota, in order for plaintiffs to establish causation, and thus a
prima facie case of medical malpractice, they must prove that it
is more probable than not that the injury was a result of the
physician's negligence. 55 Moreover, when the issues involved in
proving causation are not within the common knowledge of lay
persons, plaintiffs must present expert testimony to prove this
element.5 6 In medical malpractice actions the issues of causa-
tion and damages are often the most important, perplexing, and
difficult aspects of the case.5 7 Unfortunately, Minnesota courts
often confuse the issues of causation, damages, injuries, "theo-
ries of recovery," and "causes of actions" by inaccurately in-
terchanging or substituting one word or phrase for another, and
thus furthering error and misunderstanding in the law.58
The Minnesota legislature has also restricted medical mal-
practice claims,5 9 mandating that plaintiffs commence "all ac-
tions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, other health care
professionals ... hospitals, [and] sanatoriums, for malpractice,
error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based on contract or
54. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
55. Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992) (citing Plut-
shack v. University of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982) and Cornfeldt
v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980)). "[T]he ["more probable than
not"] standard in this state is both well settled and well grounded in considera-
tions of both equity and public policy." Id.
56. Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 121 (citing Smith v. Knowles, 281 N.W.2d 653,
656 (Minn. 1979) and Cornfeldt, 295 N.W.2d at 640); Harvey v. Fridley Medical
Ctr., P.A., 315 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 1982).
57. See HARNEY, supra note 14, at 419-27 (arguing that proof of causation
in medical malpractice actions is difficult and that because of the complexities
and uncertainties of medicine the required quantum of proof in such actions
should be less than in ordinary personal injury cases).
58. See, e.g., Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d, 758, 762-63 (Minn. 1993) (in-
terchanging "damages" and "theories of recovery" and later equating "theory of
recovery" with "cause of action"); see also infra part HI.B (discussing Fabio's
confusion of medical malpractice causation and damages law).
59. A full discussion of all legislative restrictions on medical malpractice
actions is beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses predominantly on
statutes of limitations. For a broader discussion of Minnesota legislative re-
straints and tort reform actions, see, e.g., Charles E. Spevacek, Tort Reform in
Minnesota-The Impact of the 1986 Legislative Enactments on General Civil
Litigation, 10 HAmInE L. REV. 461 (1987).
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tort" within two years.60 Medical malpractice plaintiffs may
commence actions only "after the cause of action accrues,"61 yet
the legislature failed to statutorily define when this moment oc-
curs. Furthermore, Minnesota's medical malpractice statute of
limitations does not recognize a discovery rule, a continuous
treatment provision, or any other tolling doctrine.6 2
Moreover, the Minnesota judiciary has shown great hesi-
tancy in developing tolling doctrines, generally adhering instead
to the principle that 'Tclourts have no power to extend or modify
statutory limitation periods."63 The courts have recognized only
two tolling doctrines for medical malpractice actions. First,
Minnesota courts recognize that "fraudulent concealment" by
the physician tolls the limitations period.64 To substantiate a
claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove two ele-
ments: that acting with reasonable diligence she could not have
discovered the concealment sooner and that her own negligence
did not cause the concealment; and that the concealment was
fraudulent or intentional.65 This doctrine is firmly rooted in
both fairness 66 and equity.67
In addition, Minnesota courts embrace the continuing
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West Supp. 1994).
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988).
62. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West Supp. 1994); see also supra
notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing tolling doctrines). But cf MiNN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 541.073, 541.075 (West Supp. 1994) (incorporating discovery rule
in statute of limitations governing actions for damages due to sexual abuse and
actions seeking remedies in environmental actions, respectively).
63. Johnson v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77,
81 (Minn. 1971).
64. Schinuckering v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633, 633 (Minn. 1931) (holding that
in cases of fraudulent concealment the statute of limitations commences when
the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered by the exercise
of diligence). Id. at 633.
65. See Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 795 (Minn. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 902 (1976); Collins v. Johnson, 374 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Minn. Ct. App 1985).
66. Schmuckering, 235 N.W. at 633 ("In the presence of a fiduciary and
confidential relation the fraud may more readily be perpetrated. The relation of
physician and patient of itself begets confidence and reliance on the part of the
patient." (citation omitted)).
67. The Schmuckering court discussed two equitable reasons for the fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine. Id. at 634. First, "one who cannot assert his right
because the necessary knowledge is improperly kept from him is not within the
mischief the statute [of limitations] was intended to remedy..." and second, "a
person should not be permitted to shield himself behind the statute of limita-
tions where his own fraud has placed him." Id. The court concluded its opinion
with a simple (yet subsequently often quoted) summary of the rationale behind
the doctrine: "Fraud is bad, it should not be permitted to go unchecked any-
where, and justice should always be able to penetrate its armor." Id.
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course of treatment exception. 68 In Schmit v. Esser,69 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court clearly stated that continuing treatment
tolls the statute of limitations,70 yet subsequent Minnesota case
law inconsistently characterizes the doctrine.71 In determining
when treatment has ceased, Minnesota courts traditionally ex-
amine three factors: whether a relationship exists between the
physician and the patient with regard to the illness, whether the
physician is examining and attending the patient, and whether
there is something more to be done by the physician in order to
68. See, e.g., Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1982); Schmit v.
Esser, 236 N.W. 622, 624-25 (Minn. 1931). The Schmit court stated, "[wle think
the treatment and employment [of the physician] should be considered as a
whole, and, if there occurred therein malpractice the statute of limitations be-
gins to run when the treatment ceases." Id. at 624 (citing and quoting Schmitt
v. Esser, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929)). Subsequent courts and commentators gen-
erally credit the 1931 Schmit court with establishing the continuing treatment
doctrine. The 1929 Schmitt court, however, hearing the defendant's appeal
after the trial court overruled his demurrer to the plaintiffs complaint, actually
adopted the rule first. The 1929 Schmitt court affirmed the trial court's order
and remanded the case for trial. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the de-
fendant appealed, asking for a new trial. The 1931 Schmit court, in reversing
the trial court's order, granted a new trial based on errors that occurred during
the trial, but reaffirmed the 1929 Schmitt court's statement of the continuing
treatment rule. Id. at 624-25. Courts also refer to the doctrine as the "termina-
tion of treatment" rule in recognition of the event that triggers the statute of
limitations. See, e.g., Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992), affd, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993) (referring to the doctrine in this way).
69. 236 N.W. 622 (Minn. 1931).
70. Id. at 624 ("[Tlhe statute of limitations begins to run when the treat-
ment ceases.").
71. The courts seem to use the notions of "when the statute of limitations
begins to run" and "when the cause of action accrues" interchangeably in subse-
quent cases. See, e.g., Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762 ("Generally the cause of action
accrues when the physician's treatment for the particular condition ceases."
(citing Johnson v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. 1971) and Schmit v. Esser, 236 N.W. 622, 624-25 (Minn. 1931)) (empha-
sis added)); Johnson, 190 N.W.2d at 79-81 ("[T]he event which starts the period
of limitation running against a medical malpractice action is the termination of
treatment...." (citing Schmit, 236 N.W.2d at 622) (emphasis added)).
The lack of a discovery provision in either the accrual of the cause of action
or the commencement of the limitations period, and the fact that the statute of
limitations period runs from the accrual of the action mitigates this inconsis-
tency. Under these circumstances, the same result occurs regardless of
whether the continuing treatment doctrine affects the accrual of the cause of
action or the running of the statute of limitations. This seemingly academic
distinction, however, may be crucial when analyzing statutes of limitations in
other jurisdictions. Indeed, some courts have ruled specifically on this issue.
See, e.g., Dana David Peck, Comment, The Continuing Treatment Doctrine: A
Toll on the Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 ALB.
L. REV. 64, 66 n.11 (1984) (stating that continuing treatment doctrine tolls the
New York medical malpractice statute of limitations).
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effect a cure.72 An exception exists, however, in cases in which
the alleged malpractice consists of a "single act."73 If the parties
dispute questions of material fact regarding whether the statute
of limitations bars a plaintiffs claim, a jury decides this issue.74
Both pragmatism75 and policy 76 provide a strong foundation for
the continuing course of treatment doctrine. Despite recognition
of the fraudulent concealment and continuing course of treat-
ment tolling doctrines, however, Minnesota courts continually
have refused to adopt the discovery rule.77
II. FABIO v. BELLOMO: THE PULSE WEAKENS
In Fabio v. Bellomo,78 Deloras Fabio brought a malpractice
action against Dr. James Bellomo, who served as her primary
care physician from 1977 until his retirement in 1986.79 During
72. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982) (citing Schmit,
236 N.W. at 625).
73. See Murray v. Fox, 220 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1974) (single act of surgery);
Swang v. Hauser, 180 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1970) (same). The courts have devel-
oped a test for this exception: The alleged malpractice must consist of a single
act of negligence, the act must be complete at a precise time, the act must be
incapable of being cured or relieved by a continued course of treatment, and the
plaintiff must actually be aware of the facts upon which the claim is based.
Crenshaw v. Saint Paul Ramsey Medical Ctr., 379 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Swang, 180 N.W.2d at 189-90; Murray, 220 N.W.2d 356; Col-
lins v. Johnson, 374 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
74. Noland v. Freeman, 344 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Minn. 1984); Grondahl, 318
N.W.2d at 243 (citing Schmit, 236 N.W. at 624 and Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d
277, 278 (5th Cir. 1963)).
75. See Swang, 180 N.W.2d at 189 ("A practical reason for [the continuing
course of treatment] rule is that the actionable treatment does not ordinarily
consist of a single act or, even if it does, it is most difficult to determine the
precise time of its occurrence.").
76. See id. at 189-90 ("A policy reason [for the continuing course of treat-
ment doctrine] is that the patient must repose reliance upon his physician in
the completion of the course of curative treatment, a relationship of trust which
inhibits the patient's ability to discover acts of omission or commission consti-
tuting malpractice.").
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190
N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1971). "Thus, in the absence of fraud, ignorance of the
existence of the cause of action does not toll the statute of limitations." Id.
78. 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993).
79. Id. at 760. Fabio's records show that she saw Dr. Bellomo at least 58
times between 1982 and June 1986 alone. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6,
Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993) (No. C6-91-2542) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief]. Fabio clearly stated in her deposition that Dr. Bellomo was
her primary and sole provider of general health care:
Q. Did Dr. Bellomo perform annual exams, your pelvic exams, or did
you see a gynecologist for that sort of thing?
A. I had no gynecologist. Dr. Bellomo was my doctor.
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a physical examination in 1984, Dr. Bellomo discovered a lump
in Fabio's left breast.8 0 Dr. Bellomo dismissed the lump as a
"fibrous mass" and instructed Fabio not to worry about it.81
During a physical examination in 1986, Dr. Bellomo again no-
ticed the lump in Fabio's left breast. He again diagnosed the
lump as a fibrous mass, telling her "not to worry about it."82 Af-
ter Dr. Bellomo's retirement, another physician examined Fabio,
discovered the lump, and immediately ordered a mammogram.8 3
A biopsy revealed the presence of two malignant tumors and
confirmed that the cancer had metastasized to four lymph
nodes.8 4
After completing treatment for the cancer, 5 Fabio sued Dr.
Bellomo for medical malpractice based on his failure to diagnose
and treat her condition during the 1986 examination.8 6 On the
day of trial, Fabio moved to amend her complaint to add an ac-
tion for negligence based on Dr. Bellomo's failure to properly
treat her during the 1984 examination.8 7 The trial court denied
Fabio's motion to amend her complaint, rejecting her argument
that a continuing course of treatment tolled the statute of limi-
tations and concluding that the claim was time barred.88 The
trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Bel-
MTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting deposition of Deloras Fabio
at 19).
80. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760.
81. Id. At least one commentator concludes that, due to the importance of
early detection and the comparative ease of breast lump diagnosis, whenever a
physician discovers a lump in a woman's breast, "[alt a minimum, a mam-
mogram should be performed." Corker, supra note 39, at 59.
82. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Fabio underwent a modified radical mastectomy to remove her left
breast and the four lymph nodes into which the cancer had metastasized; fol-
lowing the surgery, Fabio received nine months of chemotherapy. Fabio v. Bel-
lomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Interestingly, the supreme
court described Fabio's medical consequences quite dryly, stating simply that,
"[tihe tumor was subsequently excised, and Fabio underwent chemotherapy
treatment." Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760. Fortunately, the treatments succeeded,
and Fabio has had no signs of recurrence. Fabio, 489 N.W.2d at 245.
86. 504 N.W.2d at 760. Fabio claimed that Dr. Bellomo failed to palpate
the lump or order a mammogram when he noticed it in 1986. Id. Fabio argued
three theories of damages: (1) the delay in treatment due to Dr. Bellomo's fail-
ure to diagnose caused her to undergo chemotherapy; (2) the delay resulted in a
"loss of chance" of life expectancy and an increased risk of cancer recurrence;
and (3) the delay negligently aggravated her preexisting cancerous condition.
Id. at 761.
87. Id. at 760.
88. Id. at 761.
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lomo regarding the 1986 examination.8 9 The court of appeals
affirmed these rulings. 90 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered whether the trial court properly dismissed
Fabio's motion to amend her complaint. 91 The court also consid-
ered whether Fabio met her burden of production with respect to
causation and damages. 92 The court affirmed the judgments of
the lower courts, rejecting each of Fabio's theories of recovery93
and ruling that Dr. Bellomo's examinations of Fabio's breast
were not part of a continuing course of treatment. 94
The court began its analysis of the lower courts' denials of
Fabio's motion to amend the complaint by reviewing the basis of
the trial court's determination that Dr. Bellomo did not under-
take a continuing course of treatment with regard to Fabio's
breast.95 Next, the court examined the medical malpractice
statute of limitations and acknowledged the continuing course of
treatment rule as a tolling doctrine.96 The court then immedi-
ately decided that, as a matter of law, Dr. Bellomo's examination
of Fabio's breast did not fall within a continuing course of treat-
ment, therefore time barring her claim based on the 1984 exami-
nation.9 7 Although the parties strongly emphasized the
importance of the continuing course of treatment issue,98 the
court cited no authority, performed no legal analysis, and de-
voted only three cursory sentences to the issue:
89. Id.
90. Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 504
N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993).
91. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761. This examination necessitates an analysis
of the scope of the continuing course of treatment doctrine: "Whether the trial
court abused its discretion by denying the amendment, therefore, turns on
whether it was correct that there was no continuing course of treatment." Id. at
762.
92. Id. at 761.
93. Id. at 762-63; see also infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text (de-
tailing the court's analysis of Fabio's theories of damages).
94. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762.
95. Id. at 761. The trial court found that Dr. Bellomo's treatment of Fabio
ceased when he determined that she had no condition of her breasts requiring
further treatment on his part. Id. Thus, the trial court denied the motion to
amend because it determined that the statute of limitations barred the allega-
tion. Id. at 761-62.
96. Id. at 762.
97. Id.
98. Both parties fully briefed the issue. Indeed, continuing course of treat-
ment was the first issue addressed in both appellant's and respondent's briefs,
and it was extensively addressed in the oral arguments. Both the Minnesota
Trial Lawyers Association and the Minnesota Medical Association submitted
amicus briefs in support of the arguments on both sides of the issue, also dem-
onstrating the issue's importance.
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When Dr. Bellomo examined Fabio's breast between 1982 and 1984, he
did not recommend any further treatment. His treatment of her condi-
tion ceased at the time he told her not to worry about it. We therefore
hold that the trial court was correct to rule that Dr. Bellomo's exami-
nations of Fabio's breast that occurred between 1982 and 1984 are
barred by the statute of limitations, because these examinations were
not part of a continuing course of treatment.9 9
In a dissenting opinion, however, three justices expressed disa-
greement with the court's conclusion.100 The dissent examined
the continuing course of treatment doctrine, 0 1 analyzed the re-
lationship between Fabio and Dr. Bellomo,10 2 and concluded
that the continuing course of treatment doctrine applied.103
99. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762.
100. Id. at 763-67 (Gardebring, J., joined by Wahl & Page, JJ., dissenting).
101. The dissent first noted the importance of the continuing course of treat-
ment doctrine, pointing out that "[it] has evolved as a compromise to ameliorate
potential unfairness resulting from delayed discovery of an injury." Id. at 764
(footnote omitted). The dissent then listed the three factors the court has estab-
lished to determine whether a continuing course of treatment existed: "(1)
whether there is a relationship between physician and patient with regard to
the illness; (2) whether the physician is attending and examining the patient;
and (3) whether there is something more to be done [by the physician in order to
effect a cure]." Id. at 765 (quoting Grondahl v. Bullock, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243
(Minn. 1982)). The dissent concluded that the facts satisfied the second and
third factors. The dissent, however, was troubled by the first factor: whether a
relationship existed between Fabio and Dr. Bellomo with regard to the illness.
Id. at 765.
102. The dissent performed a thorough and detailed analysis of the issue.
First, the dissent examined the relationship between Fabio and Dr. Bellomo,
specifically reviewing the act of "diagnosis" by a physician as "treatment." Id. at
765. Justice Gardebring preliminarily concluded that, "[i]f Dr. Bellomo,
through his physician/patient relationship with Fabio, was "treating" her by ex-
amining the lump in her breast with an eye to diagnosis, I can only conclude
that there was a continuing course of treatment during this time." Id. The dis-
sent then reviewed three New York decisions-Fonda v. Paulsen, 363 N.Y.S.2d
841 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 1982),
and Shumway v. DeLaus, 543 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal dis-
missed, 554 N.E.2d 1281 (N.Y. 1990)-which addressed the issue of whether
multiple misdiagnoses triggered the continuing course of treatment exception.
Id. at 765-66. Based on the reasoning of these cases, the dissent articulated a
framework for analyzing the question:
A physician's diagnosis that nothing further is necessary does not end
"treatment" if the physician is subsequently given notice within a rea-
sonable time that the initial diagnosis was wrong. Treatment by omis-
sion can toll the statute of limitations if the subsequent misdiagnosis
occurred within a reasonable time after the initial diagnosis, and there
was a relationship between the physician and the patient.
Id. at 767.
103. In the dissenters' opinion, "whether the physician was put on notice,
through the actions of her patient or herself, that an abnormal condition ex-
isted" constitutes the key inquiry in analyzing this issue. Id. at 767. Applying
this analysis to the facts in Fabio, the dissent concluded that a continuing
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The court then turned to the issue of whether Fabio could
prove damages attributable to Dr. Bellomo's 1986 examination.
The court noted the Minnesota rule of causation in medical mal-
practice actions: plaintiffs must present expert testimony that
establishes that it is more probable than not that damages re-
sulted from the doctor's malpractice. 0 4 The court explored
Fabio's three theories of damages-chemotherapy, "loss of
chance," and "negligent aggravation of a preexisting condi-
tion"-and rejected all three.10 5 The court flatly rejected Fabio's
first argument, that undergoing chemotherapy injured her, be-
cause she admitted in oral argument that chemotherapy would
have been necessary even if Dr. Bellomo had diagnosed the can-
cer in 1986.106 Addressing Fabio's second theory of recovery,
"loss of chance," the court concluded that, "[w]e have never rec-
ognized loss of chance in the context of a medical malpractice
action, and we decline to recognize it in this case."' 0 7 Finally,
the court disallowed Fabio's "negligent aggravation of a preex-
isting condition" theory of recovery, relying on a recent decision
which it claimed rejected this theory.'08
course of treatment existed, because "Dr. Bellomo certainly possessed such
knowledge." Id.
104. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762.
105. Id. at 762-63.
106. Id. at 762.
107. Id. The court distinguished the two cases that Fabio cited to support
the theory of loss of chance recoveries in traditional tort actions: Dunshee v.
Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 1977) and Mack v. McGrath, 150 N.W.2d
681, 684 (Minn. 1967). Id. at 762-63. In Mack and Dunshee, the court allowed
recovery for potential damages from initial injuries caused by the defendants.
Id. at 763. The court noted that in these cases, "the future effects flowed di-
rectly from the initial injuries, the initial injuries were the sole cause of the
future effects, and the probabilities of their occurrence were proven with rea-
sonable medical certainty." Id. The court then distinguished Fabio's claim,
concluding that her cancer did not result from Dr. Bellomo's misdiagnosis and
that the misdiagnosis could not have been the sole cause of any future injuries
or ill effects. Id. The court also reasoned that, even if it adopted the "loss of
chance" theory of recovery, Fabio could not recover under that theory because
her physician testified that she had "at least [a] 50-50" chance of survival and
thus did not meet the "more probable than not" causation requirement. Id.




III. AFTER FABIO: DIAGNOSIS = CRITICAL CONDITION;
PRESCRIBED TREATMENT = IMMEDIATE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. FAB.IO UNWARRANTED NARROWING OF THE CONTINUING
COURSE OF TREATMENT DOCTRINE
Fabio is a troublesome decision that severely undermines
Minnesota's continuing course of treatment doctrine. The
court's three short conclusory sentences and minimal legal anal-
ysis of the continuing course of treatment issue demonstrate a
disturbing disregard for the importance of the issue and for the
fact that its result upsets the balance maintained by medical
malpractice even further in favor of physicians.' 0 9
1. Ignoring the Patient's Perspective and Eliminating the
Objective Restraint on Physicians
In addressing the continuing course of treatment issue, the
Fabio court performed virtually no legal analysis and failed to
articulate the basis for its decision. I0 In concluding that Dr.
Bellomo's treatment ceased when he told Fabio "not to worry
about" the lump in her breast, the court only noted that he did
not recommend any further treatment at the time of the exami-
nation. Because the court dispensed with explicit reasoning and
explanation, the basis of its decision must be surmised. The
court most likely based its decision on two of the three tradi-
tional continuing course of treatment factors: whether there
was a relationship between Dr. Bellomo and Fabio with regard
to the illness, or whether there was something more to be done
by Dr. Bellomo in order to effect a cure."' Because of the court's
focus on "further treatment," this Comment assumes that the
court based its decision on whether there was something more to
be done." 2
In determining whether a continuing course of treatment
existed, Minnesota courts prior to Fabio specifically examined
109. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying note 72 (listing traditional continuing
course of treatment factors).
112. But cf Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 765-67 (Gardebring, J., joined by Wahl &
Page, JJ., dissenting) (focusing on whether there was a relationship between
Fabio and Dr. Bellomo with regard to her illness). This assumption, however,
does not significantly affect this Comment's analysis. The analysis in this sec-
tion focuses on the fact that the court ignored the patient's perspective in mak-




whether the patient's injury objectively required additional at-
tention from the physician in order to effect a cure.113 An objec-
tive analysis requirement ensured the adoption of a neutral
perspective, rather than the sole perspective of the treating phy-
sician. The Fabio court eliminated objective review, however,
and adopted a "purely-physician" perspective when it ruled that
Dr. Bellomo's treatment of Fabio's breast ceased on his determi-
nation that she required no further treatment. 1 4 In reality, Dr.
Bellomo was badly mistaken; Fabio's breast contained malig-
nant lumps that required significant and immediate action to
effect a cure. The continuing course of treatment doctrine
evolved to protect the interests of patients and to protect against
the inherent unfairness that occurs when latent injuries remain
undiscovered. 1 5 Thus, any decision involving the continuing
course of treatment doctrine must examine the patient's per-
spective,' 1 6 which the Fabio decision failed to address.'1 7
After Fabio, a physician terminates the treatment and trig-
gers the statute of limitations with regard to that examination
or diagnosis by making a purely subjective determination that
the patient requires no medical attention. Hence, an unaccept-
able anomaly occurs: the physician reduces the likelihood that
the patient will seek another examination by assuring the pa-
tient that she has nothing to worry about, and in turn, with the
same assurance, minimizes the threat of objective accountabil-
ity"18 due to the increased likelihood that the statute of limita-
tions will bar a civil action. In order to protect both society's and
the patient's interests, however, the legal system must hold phy-
113. See Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Minn. 1982)
("Whether something more could be done for Mrs. Grondahl, who continually
suffered from symptoms requiring treatment, is a question to be evaluated in
light of expert medical testimony.").
114. See Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761-62.
115. See supra notes 46,51 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery
rule, the continuing course of treatment doctrine, and their common purpose of
protecting patients' rights).
116. Courts should examine decisions involving the continuing course of
treatment doctrine either solely from the patient's perspective or from a "joint"
perspective which includes the concerns of both physicians and patients. While
the patient's perspective is crucial and must be examined, this Comment fully
endorses a "joint" perspective approach which ensures that the competing inter-
ests can be appropriately examined and balanced; see infra part III.C. (propos-
ing model statute and implicitly recommending a joint perspective by allowing
juries to examine the understanding or belief of both physicians and patients).
117. The court's ruling as a matter of law to remove the issue from the jury
creates a particularly onerous effect. See infra part HI.A.2.
118. See supra note 20 (discussing notion that medical malpractice suits
provide a check on the wide discretion possessed by physicians).
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sicians accountable when their actions fall below the objective
professional standard of care. 119
2. Removing the Question From the Jury
The Fabio court decided, as a matter of law, that the mo-
ment Dr. Bellomo told Fabio "not to worry about" the lump in
her breast, he ceased to treat her condition. 120 Thus, Dr. Bel-
lomo triggered the statute of limitations with respect to his 1984
examination of Fabio's breast merely by uttering a reassuring
statement and by recommending no further treatment. Prior to
Fabio, the jury determined whether the facts of the particular
case constituted a continuing course of treatment; indeed, the
court articulated factors to help guide the jury in this evalua-
tion.121 After Fabio, at least in the case of periodic breast exam-
inations by a physician, courts must now remove the question of
continuing treatment from the jury whenever the physician fol-
lows Dr. Bellomo's example and "terminates the treatment" by
telling the patient "not to worry."
This result ignores the reality that every physician-patient
relationship is unique, and that such relationships depend a
great deal on variables such as the individual patient and doc-
tor, the length and nature of the relationship, and the nature of
the ailment treated. Reducing this complex interrelation to a
few words and phrases inappropriately prejudices patients be-
cause it gives physicians the exclusive, unilateral power to de-
fine, alter, and limit their relationships with patients.
Moreover, when a court removes important issues from the
jury's domain, it should only do so after carefully analyzing all
aspects of the issue and explicitly articulating its reasoning.
The Fabio court failed to follow this careful process of analysis.
3. Ignoring the Rationale Behind the Doctrine
Fabio ignores the primary policy rationale behind the con-
tinuing course of treatment doctrine, the need for and encour-
agement of trust in physician-patient relationships.1 22 Fabio,
however, allows physicians to trigger the statute of limitations
119. Cf Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 767 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring,
J., joined by Wahl & Page, JJ., dissenting) ("A physician's diagnosis that noth-
ing further is necessary does not end 'treatment' if the physician is subse-
quently given notice within a reasonable time that the initial diagnosis was
wrong.").
120. Id. at 762.
121. See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 50, 76 and accompanying text.
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after an examination merely by recommending no additional
treatment and assuring the patient that she has nothing to
worry about. Thus, after Fabio, patients seeking to protect their
rights regarding a possible cause of action against their physi-
cian should obtain a second opinion whenever their physicians
recommend no further treatment of a condition and conclude the
examination by saying, "you have nothing to worry about." Con-
trary to the rationale of encouraging trust between physicians
and patients, Fabio fosters distrust and second-guessing within
the relationship, eviscerating the bases on which the continuing
course of treatment doctrine rests.
Moreover, by ignoring the many variables involved in physi-
cian-patient relationships, Fabio works serious harm in the case
of an ongoing physician-patient relationship. Many physician-
patient relationships mirror the relationship between Dr.
Bellomo and Fabio: the physician exclusively provides primary
general health care services for the patient for a lengthy time
period. Such relationships necessarily involve strong trust and
reliance, and society holds an equally strong interest in main-
taining their viability. 123 The suspicion and distrust which
Fabio generates are most severe and damaging in this
situation.124
4. Increasing the Unfairness to Medical Malpractice
Plaintiffs
Minnesota, notwithstanding Fabio, imposes some of the
harshest restrictions on medical malpractice actions in the coun-
try. 25 The courts' staunch refusal to adopt the discovery rule 26
renders the continuing course of treatment exception the only
protection for plaintiffs with injuries which do not manifest
123. Indeed, patients are less likely to get a second opinion regarding rou-
tine examination and care, normally provided by a general health care provider,
than they are for a serious or unusual injury, one which may be treated by a
specialist. The current debate over health care reform, in which many citizens
continually express concern over whether they will be able to keep their present
doctors, clearly illustrates the importance of these relationships.
124. Long-term physician-patient relationships admittedly increase long-
term liability concerns of physicians, if, for example, a physician may be liable
for any and all procedures or examinations conducted during the relationship.
Fabio, however, fails to balance these concerns against the equally strong con-
cerns of society and patients for their rights.
125. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text (detailing Minnesota's
medical malpractice statute of limitations); see also infra Appendix I (graphi-
cally summarizing and comparing statutes of limitations of all fifty states and
the District of Columbia).
126. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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themselves for a long period of time after the misdiagnosis.
Courts and commentators have noted, however, that the law
must provide plaintiffs with some protection in these cases to
maintain the balance of interests between plaintiffs and physi-
cians, and it is questionable whether a state can eliminate pro-
tection to plaintiffs with regard to latent injuries. 127
Moreover, Fabio's unfairness has a disproportionately se-
vere impact on women.128 In Fabio, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ignored the importance 29 and the uniqueness' 30 of breast
cancer, jeopardizing women's ability to recover for misdiagnosis
and mistreatment of this highly discriminatory disease.' 31 If
courts continue to recognize the continuing course of treatment
doctrine, they must interpret it to provide meaningful protection
to plaintiffs. 132 At a minimum, the courts should give this issue
serious, not cursory, consideration.
B. Fabio's Continued Confusion of Medical Malpractice
Causation and Damages
In addition to tightening the statute of limitations restric-
127. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of fun-
damental fairness).
128. Fabio establishes a direct precedent for cases involving breast cancer, a
disease which is virtually exclusive to women. Once physicians learn to admin-
ister the "Dr. Bellomo assurance" ("you have nothing to worry about") at the
end of each examination, it will be very difficult for patients to distinguish their
cases from Fabio.
129. See Corker, supra note 39, at 59 ("Any lump in the female breast must
be viewed as a potentially life-threatening problem, owing to the high incidence
of death associated with breast cancer.").
130. See Hirsh, supra note 39 (detailing the numerous psychological and
emotional injuries that breast cancer inflicts upon women). "Female breast
cancer is not a simple disease with simple solutions. Rather it is a complex
disease entity with multiple problems and uncertainties involving prevention,
diagnosis and treatment, provoking, in addition to physical alterations, intense
fears and emotional disturbances." Id. at 85.
131. Ironically, the Minnesota judiciary has professed a primary and ongo-
ing concern over the issue of fairness to women within the legal system and
indeed claims to be progressing in this area. See Hon. A.M. Keith, The State of
the Judiciary, BENCH & BAR OF MThNESOTA, Sept. 1992, at 20, 22-23 ("Women
are coming to feel taken care of by this system, and I think we're making pro-
gress."). Fabio represents a significant step backwards in the process of assur-
ing fairness to women within the legal system.
132. Fabio exemplifies the tendency of Minnesota courts to focus on the spe-
cific treatment of a specific injury or ailment and essentially results in a signifi-
cant, albeit implicit, expansion of the "single act" exception. See supra note 73
and accompanying text. This focus, however, ignores the realities of medical
practice, particularly in the case of long-term treatment by a physician who
provides all or substantially all medical care to a patient.
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tion on medical malpractice actions, Fabio also rejected several
theories of recovery for cases of negligent omission, such as can-
cer misdiagnosis. To establish a prima facie medical malprac-
tice cause of action in Minnesota, plaintiffs must show that
damages resulted more probably than not from the malprac-
tice.13 3 The court firmly rejected Fabio's "loss of chance" theory
of recovery-34 and also rejected her "negligent aggravation of a
preexisting condition" theory of recovery, purporting to reaffirm
its recent decision in Leubner v. Sterner.135
The court, however, incorrectly interpreted and applied
Leubner, blurring the issues of damages and causation.
Leubner, a well-reasoned decision, reversed the appellate court's
creation of a cause of action for negligent aggravation of a preex-
isting condition. 136 The Leubner court, however, analyzed and
correctly characterized the notion of aggravation of a preexisting
condition, concluding that it is a "measure of damages, not a the-
ory of liability .. -137 Properly read, Leubner disallows an ex-
plicit cause of action for negligent aggravation but does not
preclude recovery of damages for such negligence under an al-
lowable "theory."
133. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
134. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993) ("We have never
recognized loss of chance in the context of a medical malpractice action, and we
decline to recognize it in this case."). But see Corker, supra note 39, at 62 (argu-
ing that because of the medical complexities involved and general lack of ade-
quate scientific data, "[t]he loss-of-a-chance theory is critical for representing a
plaintiff in a failure to timely diagnose and treat breast cancer case").
135. 504 N.W.2d at 763 (citing Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 122
(Minn. 1992)). Leubner involved a malpractice negligence case dealing with the
failure to diagnose and treat breast cancer. 493 N.W.2d at 120. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the plaintiffs offer
of proof failed to prove causation under the more probable than not required
standard. Id. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on several
counts, but sua sponte ruled that the plaintiff established a prima facie "cause
of action for negligent aggravation of a preexisting disease...." Id. at 120-21.
The supreme court reversed, emphasizing that the plaintiff ultimately failed to
prove causation under the required "more probable than not" standard. Id. at
122.
136. 493 N.W.2d at 120 ("We hold there is no such thing as a medical mal-
practice cause of action for 'negligent aggravation of a preexisting condition,'
and reverse the court of appeals.").
137. Id. at 122 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court concluded, "[one can
think of medical malpractice cases where there would be damages for aggrava-
tion of a preexisting condition; but, particularly in malpractice cases, the plain-
tiff cannot use the fact her condition has worsened as proof the defendant
doctor made it worse." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Leubner merely affirms the
well-established notion that plaintiffs must always prove causation under the
"more probable than not" standard, which the plaintiff in Leubner failed to do.
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The Fabio court erred in its use and application of Leubner.
The court first referred to Fabio's "theories of recovery"-chemo-
therapy, "loss of chance," and "negligent aggravation of a preex-
isting condition"-characterizing them as "forms of damages."3 8
The court, however, later equated the negligent aggravation
"theory of recovery" with "cause of action" and relied on Leubner
to disallow recovery. 13 9 If negligent aggravation is a form of
damages as Leubner (and Fabio initially) characterizes it, how-
ever, then Leubner alone does not support summary judgment in
favor of Dr. Bellomo. Causation and damages are related, yet
separate considerations, and Fabio wrongly merges the two no-
tions, furthering confusion and inconsistency in the law.140
Fabio's conflation of causation and damages essentially en-
grafts the "more probable than not" requirement on the proof of
damages. 141 Increased hardship and unfairness' 42 results, par-
ticularly in cases of negligent omission such as cancer misdiag-
nosis, especially when this result is viewed in conjunction with
Fabio's restriction of the continuing course of treatment doc-
trine. First, the court effectively states that unless patients
have lost more than a fifty percent chance of survival, they have
not sustained compensable injuries.143 In addition, only a select
138. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 762-63. 'This theory [negligent aggravation of a preexisting con-
dition] was recently rejected by this court, under very similar circumstances."
Id. at 763 (citing Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 122) (emphasis added).
140. Indeed, the courts often fail to clearly articulate the distinctions be-
tween causation and damages, and thus the law and the bar are mired in confu-
sion and uncertainty. The briefs of the two parties in Fabio clearly reveal the
problem; each side, relying on the law, characterized the issues of causation and
damages in an entirely different manner. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 79,
at 25 ("[T]he issues raised by this case are not issues of causation, but rather,
issues of damages."); Respondents Brief at 26, Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d
758 (Minn. 1993) (No. C6-91-2542) ("The issue is whether Fabio's offer of proof
as to causation is sufficient under Minnesota law to state a prima facie case of
medical malpractice.").
141. See Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 763. The court noted that even if it accepted
the loss of chance theory, Fabio could not recover under that theory because her
physician testified that she had at least a "50-50" chance of long-term survival;
a 50% chance of survival does not meet the "more probable than not" damage
requirement. Id.
142. See Corker, supra note 39, at 60 (arguing that fairness demands mal-
practice protection in cases of breast cancer misdiagnosis and mistreatment).
"Because early detection of breast cancer offers the best opportunity for cure, a
patient whose breast cancer has been negligently misdiagnosed should be fairly
compensated." Id.
143. The imprecision inherent in these medical predictions heightens this
unfairness. A physician testifying in a malpractice case could respond to a
question regarding the likelihood of recovery by saying either "about 50-50" or
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group of cancer patients can now recover in malpractice for neg-
ligent diagnosis or treatment: only those patients who lost at
least fifty-one percent chance of survival and also discovered the
injury within two years of the negligent act. Thus, Fabio per-
mits recovery in malpractice solely based on chance or, in a very
jaded sense, the patient's "good fortune" of sustaining and dis-
covering serious injury. Medical malpractice actions protect the
rights of patients and society, and this protection is not intended
to hinge, nor should it hinge, on mere fortuity. This Comment
urges the judiciary to reconsider the results which follow from
Fabio and to clearly articulate its reasoning and analysis when
addressing the issues of causation and damages in future medi-
cal malpractice actions.
C. RECOMMENDATION: DON'T CALL 911 FOR AN AMBULANCE,
CALL THE LEGISLATURE FOR AN AMENDMENT
In light of Fabio, the Minnesota legislature must act to re-
store the balance in medical malpractice law. This issue in-
volves two equally strong, competing concerns: Minnesota's
ongoing concern of attracting, encouraging, and supporting med-
ical practice and technology development; and Minnesota's con-
cern, consistent with its progressive reputation, of protecting
and securing the rights of its citizens, particularly those that
have wrongfully sustained serious injury. In the case of medical
malpractice, the judiciary has shifted the balance of these con-
cerns markedly in favor of physicians; the legislature must now
restore the balance. The legislature should remedy this problem
by amending the medical malpractice statute of limitations.I4 4
"a little less than 50-50," and quite possibly intend the same meaning. Thus, a
plaintiffs recovery depends solely on whether her physician was properly
"coached" to respond "49%" or "less than 50%" versus "about 50%." Moreover,
seriously ill patients who have less than a 50% chance of survival when first
treated by physicians have absolutely no recourse for any negligent omissions,
regardless of how severe the negligence might be.
144. Specifically, the medical malpractice statute of limitations should be
amended to codify the continuing course of treatment exception as a tolling doc-
trine. To date, courts have presumed the existence of the rule as a tolling doc-
trine within the statutory scheme.
Minn.Stat. [sic] § 541.07 has been amended several times since the
termination of treatment rule was set forth in Schmitt in 1929.... We
therefore conclude the legislature has presumptively adopted the ter-
mination of treatment rule for determining the time when a medical
malpractice claim accrues and the two-year statute of limitation period
begins to run.
Willette v. Mayo Found., 458 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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This Comment proposes a model statute and articulates a
framework for legislative action.
Fabio muddied the state of the continuing course of treat-
ment doctrine by taking a very narrow reading of it,145 and by
establishing a rule of law for negligent omission cases.146 The
legislature should abrogate the effect of Fabio by reasserting the
doctrine as a protection for medical malpractice plaintiffs.
1 47
Specifically, the legislature should amend the statute of limita-
tions, returning to the framework established in Grondahl v.
Bulluck,'48 and allowing the jury to resolve questions of continu-
ing treatment. The following proposed model medical malprac-
tice statute of limitations embodies this framework and reflects
a realistic and acceptable compromise for Minnesota legislators
on this issue:149
NOTE: Statutory language not denoted in italics is borrowed from the
present statute of limitations in § 541.07(1).
PROPOSED MNN. STAT. ANN. § 541.076. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
All actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, other health
care professionals as defined in § 145.61, and veterinarians as defined
in chapter 156, hospitals, or sanitariums for malpractice, error, mis-
take or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must be com-
menced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action; provided
that a counter-claim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for
services brought by a physician, surgeon, dentist or other health care
professional or veterinarian, hospital or sanatorium, after the limita-
tions herein described notwithstanding it is barred by the provisions of
this chapter, if it was the property of the party pleading it at the time it
became barred and was not barred at the time the action accrued, but
no judgment thereof except for costs can be rendered in favor of the
party so pleading it. For purposes of this section, "physician" refers
generally to all individuals and entities listed above. For purposes of
this section, an action accrues at the time of the act or incident which is
the subject matter of the claim. If there is a continuing course of treat-
ment between a physician and a patient with regard to an injury or
145. See supra part III.A.4.
146. See supra part IIIA.2.
147. This Comment, however, makes no recommendation as to retroactive
application of any such enactment. For a detailed discussion of the validity of
retroactive legislation that affects statutes of limitations, see Patrick T. Mur-
phy, Note, Section 27A of the SEA: An Unplugged Lampf Sheds No Constitu-
tional Light, 78 MINN. L. REV. 197 (1994) (analyzing the constitutionality of
retroactive federal statute of limitations legislation).
148. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
149. This recommendation assumes that the Minnesota legislature will con-
tinue to impose a two-year statute of limitations, reaffirm its commitment to
both the continuing course of treatment and fraudulent concealment tolling
doctrines, and also continue to distinguish itself from the vast majority of states
by refusing to adopt a form of the widely accepted discovery rule.
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ailment, the limitation period herein described will be tolled until the
time at which such treatment ceases. Whether there was a continuing
course of treatment is a question for the jury to consider in light of the
following factors: (1) whether there is a relationship between the physi-
cian and patient with regard to the illness; (2) whether the physician is
attending and examining the patient; (3) whether there is objectively
something more to be done by the physician in order to effect a cure; (4)
the length and nature of the physician-patient relationship; (5) the na-
ture of the injury, ailment or disease involved; (6) the understanding or
beliefs of both the physician and the patient; and (7) any other evidence
which might be relevant or useful in this determination. If a physician
prevents a patient from discovering a cause of action by fraudulent con-
cealment, the limitation period herein described will be tolled until the
patient discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the cause of action. Whether there was fraudulent concealment is a
question for the jury. This section shall be interpreted broadly.
The legislature should enact a separate medical malpractice
statute of limitations to increase clarity and to symbolize the im-
portance of the issue. The statute should establish a limitations
period of two years and provide details specifying which health
care professionals and claims are governed by the statute. The
statute should also specify that a medical malpractice cause of
action accrues at the time of the act or incident that caused the
injury.
In addition, the statute should specifically list and explain
the circumstances that will toll the statute of limitations. First,
the statute should recognize and define the continuing course of
treatment exception as a tolling doctrine. This description
should specify that a jury must decide the question of continuing
course of treatment in a given case, listing the factors the jury
should consider in making this determination. These factors
should include and broaden those listed in Grondahl v. Bul-
luck' 50 to allow consideration of more evidence, consistent with
an expansive interpretation of the doctrine.
Next, the statute should recognize and define the fraudu-
lent concealment exception as a tolling doctrine, similarly speci-
fying that a jury must decide the question of fraudulent
concealment in a given case. Finally, the statute should man-
date a broad interpretation of these factors. This framework
eliminates confusion and ambiguity by clearly articulating the
crucial aspects of the statute of limitations and restores the bal-
ance of interests by broadening the scope of the continuing
course of treatment doctrine.' 5 '
150. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
151. It should be noted, however, that there are many possible alternative




In Fabio v. Bellomo, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that, as a matter of law, no continuing course of treatment ex-
isted between a physician and patient when the physician ex-
amined the patient's breast twice during a two year period,
twice found a lump, and after each examination recommended
no further treatment and told the patient "not to worry about"
the lump. Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs theo-
ries of recovery, concluding that she failed to state a cause of
action in medical malpractice.
The supreme court's ruling shifts the balance of interests
maintained by medical malpractice actions significantly in favor
of physicians, and confuses the already muddled areas of mal-
practice causation and damages law. The ruling also under-
mines the continuing course of treatment doctrine and its
validity as a toll on the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations. This Comment urges the Minnesota legislature to
amend the medical malpractice statute of limitations to clarify
and stabilize this area of the law, and proposes a model medical
malpractice statute of limitations and a framework for legisla-
tive action to serve this end.
ration of creative solutions and compromises to obtain a more equitable balance
between the competing interests involved. Oklahoma provides an example of
such ingenuity, incorporating both the discovery rule and a modified statute of
repose into its statutory scheme. See OuL. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West 1989)
(providing that.plaintiffs must bring medical malpractice suits within two years
of discovery, but also providing that plaintiffs who bring such an action more
than three years after the date of the injury, rather than being barred as is the
case with a normal statute of repose, may only recover actual medical and sur-
gical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a direct result of the injury). This
approach strikes an inventive balance between the rights of patients and soci-




The following table summarizes the medical malpractice
statutes of limitations in all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia, which are listed in the first column. The second column
describes the type of the statute of limitations: a statute specific
to medical malpractice ("S"), a generally applicable statute ("G"),
or a general statute that specifically addresses medical malprac-
tice ("GIS"). The third column lists the limitations period. The
fourth column indicates whether the cause of action accrues at
the date of the act or omission. The fifth column denotes
whether the statute allows discovery of the injury, either in the
accrual of the cause of action or as a toll on the limitations pe-
riod. Any period noted in parentheses represents the time
within which a patient is required to file suit after the date of
discovery. The sixth column indicates whether the statute rec-
ognizes the termination of treatment doctrine, either in the ac-
crual of the cause of action or as a toll on the limitations period.
The seventh column describes any qualifications or unique fea-
tures within the statute, primarily regarding accrual of the limi-
tations period and the information outlined in columns four and
five. The eighth column lists the length of any repose period ex-
plicitly or implicitly established by the statute. The ninth col-
umn indicates whether the statute recognizes the presence of a
foreign object in the patient's body as a toll on the limitations
period. Any period noted in parentheses represents the time
within which a patient is required to file suit after discovery of
any such object. The tenth column indicates whether the stat-
ute recognizes fraudulent concealment of the act, omission, or
injury by the physician as a toll on the limitations period. Any
period noted in parentheses represents the time within which a
patient is required to file suit after discovery of such fraudulent
action.
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AL S 2 yrs X X(6mos.) 4 yrs
AK G 2 yrs X
AZ G/S 2 yrs X
AR S 2yrs X X ( lyr)
CA S 3yrs X X(1 yr)_a. 3yrs X X
CO S 2yrs X ifnodisc, noSOL 3yrs X(2yrs) X(2yrs)
CT GfS 2 yrs X X 2 yrs from act or 3 yrs
discovery
DE S 2yrs X X 3yrs
DC G 3yrs X
FL GIS 2 yrs X X 2 yrs from act or 4 yrs X (2 yrs,
discovery 7 yr
repose)
GA S 2yrs 2 yrs from occur- 5yrs X
rence of injury
HI S 2yrs X 6yrs X




IL S 2yrs X 4yrs
IN S 2yrs X
IA G/S 2_yrs x 6yrs X
KS GIS 2 yrs X X 2 yrs from act 4 yrs
unless injury not
discovered
KY G/S 1 yr X 5 yrs
LA S i yr X X 1 yr from act or 3 yrs
discovery
TE S 3 yrs Xx
HD S - X (5 X(3 yrs) a.X
yrs)
MTA G/S 3 yrs b. 7 yrs X
IM S 2 yrs X X(6 mos.) 2 yrs from act or 6 6 yrs X (6 X (6
rues. from disc, rues.) rues.)
whichever is later
ION G/S 2 yrs X
MS S 2 yrs X 2 yrs from discovery




MT S 3 yrs X X c. 5 yrs X
NE S 2 yrs X X(I yr) 2 yrs from act or 1 10 yrs
yr from discovery
NV S - X(4 X(2 yrs) a. 4yrs X
yrs)
NH G 3yrs X X
SOL
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NJ G 2yrs b.
NM S 3yrs X
NY S 2yrs, X X from act or last X(I yr)
6 mos. treatment
NC GIS 3yrs X(lyr) X(last 3 yrs from last act 4yrs X(lyr,
act of or I yr from discov- (from 10 yr
defend- ery, whichever last act repose)
ant) occurs later of
defend-
ant)
ND GIS 2 yrs b. 6 yrs X
OH G/S 1 yr b. (SOL pd may be 4 yrs
extended 180 days
if claimant gives
notice within the 1
yr pd,)
OK S 2 yrs X modified statute of e.
repose
OR G/S 2 yrs X 5 yrs X (2 yrs)
PA G 2yrs
RI S 3yrs X X c.
SC S 3 yrs X X (3 yrs) c. 6 yrs X (2 yrs)
SD S 2 yrs X
TN S 1 yr X X 1 yr from act or 3 yrs X(1 yr) X (1 yr)
discovery
TX S 2 yrs X X 2 yrs from act or
completion of treat-
ment
UT S 2yrs X 4yrs X (lyr) X (1 yr)
VT S - X(3 X(2yrs) d. 7yrs X(2yr) X
yrs)
VA G/S 2 yrs b. X (I yr, X (I yr,
10 yr 10 yr
repose) repose)
WA S 3yrs X X (1 yr) d. 8yrs X X
WV S 2yrs X X d. 10yrs X
WI S - X(3 X(lyr) d. 5yrs X(lyr) X(lyr)
yrs)
WY S 2 yrs X X d. (if the malprac-
tice is discovered
during the second
yr of the 2 yr SOL,
the SOL pd is
extended 6 mos.)
a. Whichever occurs earlier (act v. discovery)
b. From accrual
c. 3 yrs from act or discovery
d. Whichever occurs later (act v. discovery)
e. Doesn't bar action. If suit is brought more than 3 yrs after date of act, recovery is limited to
actual expenses incurred as direct result of injury.
